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PEACEFUL PICKETING-CONSTITUTIONALLY
PROTECTED?
By OSMOND K. FRAENIXEL f
In some recent decisions the Supreme Court has greatly increased
the power of judges to issue injunctions which ban peaceful picketing.
For a long time the only limitation on the power of the courts to enjoin
peaceful picketing had been their own self-restraint." Legislative at-
tempts to check this power in the early part of the century foundered
either on the notion, at one time sponsored by the Supreme Court,'
that any attempt to regulate labor relations was class legislation, or on
the idea, voiced by some other courts, that it infringed on their own
inherent power.' The day of such decisions has passed, presumably
forever. Modern anti-injunction statutes have survived all challenge
of constitutionality.' Yet peaceful picketing continues to be enjoined
-and not only in the states which have no such modern statutes.
In attempting to place the law of picketing beyond the control of
even state legislatures, labor lawyers sought to invoke the protection
of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. They claimed
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1. See American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U. S.
184 (1921) where Chief Justice Taft held that, at least in a direct labor controversy,
peaceful picketing could not be enjoined even when carried on by persons who had
never been employees. For extensive discussions of the subject see FRANKFURTER AND
GRuENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930); WiTTE, THE GOVERNMENT IN LABOR Dis-
PuTEs (1932). See also Fraenkel, Recent Statutes Affecting Labor Injunctions and
Yellow Dog Contracts, 30 ILL L. REv. 854 (1936) ; Fraenkel, Judicial Interpretation
of Labor Laws, 6 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 577 (1939).
2. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312 (1921).
3. See Bogni v. Perotti, 224 Mass. 152, 112 N. E. 853 (1916); May's Furs &
Ready-to-Wear v. Bauer, 255 App. Div. 643, 8 N. Y. S. 2d 819 (2d Dep't 1939) the
views there expressed, however, were rejected on appeal, 282 N. Y. 331, 26 N. E. 2d
279 (1940). See also FRANKFURTER AND GREENE, Op. cit. spra note 1, at 151-154;
WITE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 271-2.
4. See Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U. S. 468 (1937).
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that peaceful picketing was merely an aspect of free speech. The dif-
ficulty with completely accepting that concept is due to the fact that,
while picketing may constitute expression of opinion and therefore is
an aspect of free speech, it is also an act having a definite impact on
the business of the employer. Picket lines have a double effect on a
community: certain persons will not cross any picket line as a matter
of principle; others will be dissuaded from crossing a particular line
because of the character of the dispute advertised.
Before 1940 the view that picketing was constitutionally protected
as free speech had received only scattered judicial approval.5 Among
such early formulations was a dictum by Mr. Justice Brandeis in Senn
v. Tile Layers Union.6 In upholding a state statute which restricted
the use of injunctions in labor disputes, he said:
"Members of a union might, without special statutory au-
thorization by a State, make known the facts of a labor dispute,
for freedom of speech is guaranteed by the Federal Constitu-
tion." 7
The first actual decision came in 1940, in Thornhill v. Alabama.8
There, over the sole dissent of Mr. Justice McReynolds, the Supreme
Court held void a state statute which completely prohibited peaceful
picketing. Mr. Justice Murphy pointed out:
"In the circumstances of our times the dissemination of in-
formation concerning the facts of a labor dispute must be regarded
as within that area of free discussion that is guaranteed by the
Constitution." '
In that case, however, the Court made clear that the states retain
the right to regulate abuses of picketing. The important question left
open was whether such abuses related only to the manner in which the
picketing was carried out or extended to its objectives.
In 1941, two cases raised the first of these problems: the nanner
in which picketing was conducted. In dealing with them the Court
made clear that the constitutional protection included state judicial
action as well as legislation.
In one of these cases, American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 0
the majority of the Supreme Court struck down a state court injunction
5. Individual Retail Food Store Owners Ass'n v. Penn Treaty Ass'n, 33 D. & C.
100 (Pa. C. P. 1938) ; Schuster v. International Ass'n, 293 Ill. App. 177, 193 (1937).
See also 48 YALE L. J. 308, 312 (1938).
6. 301 U. S. 468 (1937).
7. Id. at 478.
8. 310 U. S. 88 (1940).
9. Id. at 102.
10. 312 U. S. 321 (1941).
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which was motivated by the circumstance that no members of the union
had been employed at the place picketed. There was no claim that the
picketing was accompanied by violence. Chief Justice Hughes and
Justice Roberts dissented on technical grounds. Mr. Justice Frank-
furter pointed out that the state had too narrowly circumscribed the
labor relation:
ii. . . We are asked to sustain a decree which for pur-
poses of this case asserts as the common law of a state that there
can be no 'peaceful picketing or peaceful persuasion' in relation
to any dispute between an employer and a trade union unless the
employer's own employees are in controversy with him.
"Such a ban of free communication is inconsistent with the
guarantee of freedom of speech. That a state has ample power to
regulate the local problems thrown up by modern industry and to
preserve the peace is axiomatic. But not even these essential
powers are unfettered by the requirements of the Bill of Rights.
The scope of the Fourteenth Amendment is not confined by the
notion of a particular state regarding the wise limits of an injunc-
tion in an industrial dispute, whether those limits be defined by
statute or by the judicial organ of the state. A state cannot ex-
clude workingmen from peacefully exercising the right of free
communication by drawing the circle of economic competition be-
tween employers and workers so small as to contain only an em-
ployer and those directly employed by him. The interdependence
of economic interest of all engaged in the same industry has be-
come a commonplace." "
In the other case, Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmore
Dairies, Inc., 2 the majority of the Court upheld an injunction against
all picketing because the state court had concluded that previous vio-
lence in connection with the particular strike justified a ban on even
peaceful picketing in the future. Justice Frankfurter concluded that
nothing in the Constitution forbade a state from reaching a conclusion
such as this and that it was important to leave freedom of action in the
field to the states. ie suggested that if the injunction should ever be
put to improper use, recourse could again be had to the Supreme Court.
Mr. Justice Black (with whose view Justice Douglas concurred)
challenged both the basis on which the majority rested and the correct-
ness of its views. He maintained that the state court had not relied
for its decision on the element of violence, but on the finding that the
picketing was illegal because it hurt the employer's business. He con-
cluded that such a holding resulted in an unconstitutional restriction
of peaceful picketing. Justice Reed dissented separately, pointing out
11. Id. at 325, 326.
12. 312 U. S. 287 (1941).
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that the remedy lay "in the maintenance of order, not in denial of
speech"."3
In the next year the Court dealt with the second alternative,
above: the effect on peaceful picketing of an objective found improper
by the state court. In so doing it foreshadowed the position more
specifically taken in the very recent cases, that state policy controls.
The majority of the Court, in Carpenters & Joiners Union v. Ritter's
Cafe,14 upheld a ban on picketing even though no violence had occurred
at any time, because the Texas court had determined that the union
had violated its anti-trust laws. There the union picketed a restaurant
because it had a dispute with a contractor employed by the owner of
that restaurant to erect a building at a place in the town which was not
in any way connected with the restaurant. Mr. Justice Frankfurter
emphasized the fact that the person picketed was not involved in the
labor dispute. He maintained that Texas had a right to declare it
contrary to its public policy for a union to "conscript neutrals to help
in a dispute with its employer".
Mr. Justice Black, with the concurrence of Justices Douglas and
Murphy, dissented on the ground that the union should have the right
to influence the contractor through the restaurant owner who employed
him. Justice Reed again dissented separately, arguing that in balanc-
ing social differences it was more important to preserve free speech
than to relieve the enterprise of the burden of the picket line.
On the other hand, in the Wohl case15 the Court unanimously
held void an injunction against picketing by milk drivers of customers
of the concern with which the drivers had a controversy. This deci-
sion rested in part on the circumstance that there was no other way
readily to publicize the dispute and in part because the Court felt the
repercussion on the strangers to the dispute to be but slight. Justices
Black, Douglas and Murphy filed a separate opinion commenting on
this pair of cases and expressed the fear they could be interpreted so
as to permit picketing only when it was ineffective.
A later case of this period 16 held that a state could not enjoin
peaceful picketing merely because signs carried by the pickets contained
epithets such as "Unfair" or "Fascist" or because the owner had
claimed that all his employees had become his partners. The Court
pointed out also that it was immaterial that the anti-injunction act of
the particular state, as construed by its highest court, did not specifically
13. Id. at 319.
14. 315 U. S. 722 (1942).
15. Bakery & Pastry Drivers v. Wohl, 315 U. S. 769 (1942).
16. Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos, 320 U. S. 293 (1943).
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safeguard picketing in this situation. The right to picket peacefully
insofar as it was protected as an expression of opinion rested on the
Constitution and not on the state statute.
So the problem rested for many years. Then, in 1949 came Lin-
coln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Company,
17
where the Supreme Court unanimously upheld the right of states to
outlaw closed shop contracts. While this case did not involve picketing
it is here important because it made clear to the labor movement that
the Supreme Court would allow the states great freedom to legislate
on the subject of labor relations. As Mr. Justice Black said:
"This Court beginning at least as early as 1934, when the
Nebbia case was decided, has steadily rejected the due process
philosophy enunciated in the Adair-Coppage line of cases. In
doing so it has consciously returned closer and closer to the earlier
constitutional principle that states have power to legislate against
what are found to be injurious practices in their internal com-
mercial and business affairs, so long as their laws do not run afoul
of some specific federal constitutional prohibition, or of some valid
federal law. See Nebbia v. New York, supra at 523-524, and
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, supra at 392-395, and cases
cited. Under this constitutional doctrine the due process clause
is no longer to be so broadly construed that the Congress and state
legislatures are put in a strait jacket when they attempt to suppress
business and industrial conditions which they regard as offensive
to the public welfare.
"Appellants now ask us to return, at least in part, to the due
process philosophy that has been deliberately discarded. Claiming
that the Federal Constitution itself affords protection for union
members against discrimination, they nevertheless assert that the
same Constitution forbids a state from providing the same pro-
tection for non-union members. Just as we have held that the due
process clause erects no obstacle to block legislative protection of
union members, we now hold that legislative protection can be
afforded non-union workers." '8
The logic of this decision was, in the same year, applied to peaceful
picketing in Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Company.'9 In Mis-
souri, where labor unions are subject to the anti-trust laws, the state
court had enjoined picketing because it was part of an attempt to
monopolize the particular industry by forcing the employer not to sell
to non-union concerns. Mr. Justice Black, for a unanimous Court,
held this injunction to be within state power, on the ground that the
17. 335 U. S. 525 (1949).
18. Id. at 536, 537.
19. 336 U. S. 490 (1949).
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
activity of which the picketing was part was criminal under a valid
state statute. He said:
"We think the circumstances here and the reasons advanced
by the Missouri courts justify restraint of the picketing which was
done in violation of Missouri's valid law for the sole immediate
purpose of continuing a violation of law. In holding this, we are
mindful of the essential importance to our society of a vigilant
protection of freedom of speech and press. Bridges v. California,
314 U. S. 252, 263. States cannot consistently with our Consti-
tution abridge those freedoms to obviate slight inconveniences or
annoyances. Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 162. But pla-
cards used as an essential and inseparable part of a grave offense
against an important public law cannot immunize that unlawful
conduct from state control. Virginia Electric Co. v. Board, 319
U. S. 533, 539; Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 536, 537, 538,
539-540. Nor can we say that the publication here should not
have been restrained because of the possibility of separating the
picketing conduct into illegal and legal parts. Thomas v. Collins,
supra, at 547. For the placards were to effectuate the purposes
of an unlawful combination, and their sole, unlawful immediate
objective was to induce Empire to violate the Missouri law by
acquiescing in unlawful demands to agree not to sell ice to non-
union peddlers." 20
And on May 8, 1950, the Supreme Court unanimously (without
the participation of Mr. Justice Douglas) applied the principle of these
last two cases to one situation where the state statute had not made the
prohibited conduct criminal, and to another where the state policy was
laid down by judicial utterance, not legislative enactment. The irony
of both these cases is that state policy favorable to labor unions became
the basis for issuing injunctions against peaceful picketing.
The first case presents no real problem. In Building Service
Employees International Union v. Gazzam2" the union picketed an
employer because he refused to compel his employees to join that union.
Had he attempted to influence his employees in their choice of a union
he would have violated the Labor Relations Act of the state of Wash-
ington. The picketing in this case was directed at the employer, not
at the non-union employees. There can be no quarrel with the Su-
preme Court's decision that the enjoining of such picketing did not
violate the constitutional guarantee of free speech and that it was im-
material that the state statute did not, as in the Giboney case, make the
prohibited action punishable as a criminal offense. Clearly the state
legislature must have the right to determine what sanctions to employ
20. Id. at 501, 502.
21. 339 U. S. 532 (1950).
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to deal with acts held to be contrary to public policy. But it does not
follow that in a State having a statute which restricts the use of in-
junctions in labor disputes an injunction may issue without complying
with the procedural requirements of such statute merely because the
objective of the picketing is illegal.2"
The second case decided on May 8, 1950 presents a much more
troublesome problem. Here no state statute prohibited the action
taken. California courts had; however, declared that discrimination
by labor unions on racial grounds was improper under certain circum-
stances.3 On the basis of this holding the California court upheld an
injunction against picketing designed to force an employer to hire
Negroes on a quota basis. In Hughes v. Superior Court 2'4 the Supreme
Court unanimously agreed. Mr. Justice Frankfurter said:
"The policy of a State may rely for the common good on the
free play of conflicting interests and leave conduct unregulated.
Contrariwise, a State may deem it wiser policy to regulate. Regu-
lations may take the form of legislation, e.g., restraint of trade
statutes, or be left to the ad hoc judicial process, e.g., common law
mode of dealing with restraints of trade. Either method may out-
law an end not in the public interest or merely address itself to the
obvious means toward such end. The form the regulation should
take and its scope are surely matters of policy and, as such, within
a State's choice.
"If because of the compulsive features inherent in picketing,
beyond the aspect of mere communication as an appeal to reason,
a State chooses to enjoin picketing to secure submission to a de-
mand for employment proportional to the racial origin of the then
customers of a business, it need not forbid the employer to adopt
such a quota system of his own free will. A State is not required
to exercise its intervention on the basis of abstract reasoning. The
Constitution commands neither logical symmetry nor exhaustion
of a principle." 25
In holding that it was immaterial that the state had expressed its
policy through its courts rather than its legislature, Mr. Justice Frank-
furter relied on cases in none of which, however, the question now
presented had arisen. These were either cases which decided that a
state court's declaration of the meaning of its own law is binding on
22. The Supreme Court made it clear that a federal court cannot issue an injunc-
tion merely because the objective of the picketing is illegal: Lauf v. Shinner, 303 U. S.
323 (1938). Cf. Grace Co. v. Williams, 96 F. 2d 478 (8th Cir. 1938) ; Donnelly Gar-
ment Co. v. I. L, G. W. U., 99 F. 2d 309 (8th Cir. 1938). Some state courts have
adopted a contrary view: see cases cited in footnotes 51-55, 6 U. OF CHi. L. Rav. 577,
587.
23. James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P. 2d 329 (1944) ; Williams v.
International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, 27 Cal. 2d 586, 165 P. 2d 903 (1946).
24. 339 U. S. 460 (1950).
25. Id. at 468.
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the Supreme Court 26 or cases which held that state practice can make
something lawful in the absence of an express legislative declaration to
that effect.27 Not one of these cases dealt with a state court's declara-
tion that certain conduct violated state policy where no statute existed
for the court's interpretation.
It is surprising that the Court's decision in the Hughes case was
unanimous,"8 for the logic underlying it insured that the Court would
differ on the character of the actions which state judges might, with-
out constitutional hindrance, declare improper. While it may be
logical to assert that a state can decide how its public policy should
be declared, a blind adherence to that logic in the area of freedom of
expression leads to impossible results. Moreover, it is clear that a
distinction does exist between legislative and judicial law making proc-
esses. When a legislature has passed a bill it gives advance warning
to the community in reasonably definite terms that certain action is
prohibited and prescribes the applicable sanctions. When judges de-
clare that something is contrary to public policy, they do so after the
event and usually in broad general terms, and they devise their own
sanctions. No one can ever know what may next be so declared by
judges and thus affect his past conduct. Such judicial statements do
not come to the Supreme Court "encased in the armor wrought by
prior legislative determination." 29
Moreover, legislatures act in conformity with the democratic prin-
ciple: there is opportunity, often in advance, through public hearings
and pressure groups, always by the later use of the franchise, for pub-
lic participation in the process. Judges are ordinarily subject to no
such public influence. And in no field is this truer than in that of labor
relations. Indeed, the motivation behind the modern anti-injunction
laws was just this feeling that judges read their economic prejudices
into the principles of public policy. It is still true that "in dealing
with these lively issues, sterility and unconscious partisanship readily
assume the subtle guise of 'legal principles'." " Good reasons exist,
therefore, for treating judge-made law differently from state law.
26. E.g., Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U. S. 69 (1941) ; Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U. S.
312 (1926) ; Castillo v. McConnico, 168 U. S. 674 (1898).
27. E.g., Nashville C. & St. Louis Ry. v. Browning, 310 U. S. 362 (1940)-the
last case cited, Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U. S. 1 (194), falls in part within this
category although it really holds only that an allegation that a state law has been
violated creates no federal right which the federal courts will redress.
28. Justices Black, Minton and Reed separately stated their concurrence in the
belief that the case was controlled by the decision in the Giboney case. Justice Reed
in addition stated that he understood the opinion of the California court to hold that
discrimination "in favor" of a particular race was unlawful.
29. Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252, 261 (1941), quoted with approval in
C. I. 0. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382 (1950).
30. Frankfurter and Greene, op. cit. supra note 1, at 46.
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The circumstances of the Hughes case themselves illustrate this
problem. If California had a law like that of New York and a few
other states, which prohibited racial discrimination by employers, it
could well be held that picketing to compel hiring on a racial quota
basis seeks to induce an employer to violate that law. For the pur-
pose of such legislation is to forbid an employer to consider racial
factors at all. Thus if the employer had acceded to the request to
employ Negroes on a quota basis, he would have laid himself open
to the administrative process provided by the law in exactly the same
way as would the employer in the Gazzam case. Absent such a law
there are no sanctions against an employer who might be willing to
accede to the demands of a union that he employ Negroes on a quota
basis.
Perhaps the real answer lies in the question of sanctions. Auto-
matic approval of injunctions against picketing because of the "ille-
gality" of the objective should be confined to those situations in which
the person picketed could not comply with the end desired by the
picketers without incurring sanctions under state law, whether statutory
or judge-made. If, for instance, the California courts had established
a principle that racial discrimination by employers (as well as by labor
unions) was against public policy and so could be enjoined at the in-
stance of an aggrieved person, the result achieved in the Hughes case
could be justified. Perhaps a legislative declaration of policy pro-
hibiting discrimination by employers even without legislative specifica-
tion of sanctions might be sufficient to permit the enjoining of pickets,
since it might also form a basis for the enjoining of an employer who
discriminated. The vice of the opinion in the Hughes case is that it
slides over this issue and merely pronounces it immaterial that the
state did not prohibit the employer from adopting a quota system of
his own free will.
Does that mean that in all other situations picketing is consti-
tutionally protected as a form of spee speech? The Supreme Court
has never thought so, as the Ritter case shows.3 1 But the Court has
never been able to formulate a satisfactory principle to indicate the
dividing line. Now, as in former times, the question of picketing in
connection with secondary boycotts will prove troublesome." The
nearest approach to a modern decision by the Supreme Court on this
31. 315 U. S. 722 (1942).
32. People v. Bellows, 281 N. Y. 67, 22 N. E. 2d 238 (1939) ; Canepa v. "John
Doe", 277 N. Y. 52, 12 N. E. 2d 790 (1938) ; Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N. Y. 281,
11 N. E. 2d 910 (1937). Cf. International Brotherhood v. N. L. R. B., 181 F. 2d 34
(2d Cir. 1950), Clark, J. dissenting at 40. See generally Barnard and Graham, Labor
and the Secondary Boycott, 15 WAsH. L. R1 . 137 (1940).
0
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subject was the Wohl case.3" There the Court unanimously struck
down a ban on peaceful picketing because it was satisfied that under
the circumstances the picketing-had a reasonable relation to the exist-
ing labor controversy. The Supreme Court did not then take the
view that it was enough to justify a state court's ban on such picketing
that there was a problem involving labor relations about which rea-
sonable men might differ.
Yet it seems this latter principle rather than the former one which
guided the Court in the third of the cases decided on May 8, 1950,
International Brotherhood v. Hanke3 4 This time the Court was not
unanimous. Indeed, this may be considered a 5-4 decision for it is
probable that Mr. Justice Douglas would have joined the dissenters
had he participated. There, picketing was designed to force an indi-
vidual aoing business without any employees to conform to the union's
pattern with regard to closing time. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, for the
majority, upheld the state's action on the ground that the State of
Washington, through its courts, had the right to balance the value
to the union of industry-wide compliance with the standards against
the value to the community of unfettered self-employers. He stressed
the fact that the number of non-conformists was small. In distin-
guishing some of the earlier cases he advanced the formalistic argu-
ment that the state courts had not there expressly declared illegal the
objective for which they enjoined the picketing. Mr. Justice Frank-
furter, after quoting the state court's justification for its decision, said:
"We are, needless to say, fully aware of the contentious na-
ture of these views. It is not our business even remotely to hint
at agreement or disagreement with what has commended itself
to the State of Washington, or even to intimate that all the
relevant considerations are exposed in the conclusions reached
by the Washington court. They seldom are in this field, so de-
ceptive and opaque are the elements of these problems. That is
precisely what is meant by recognizing that they are within the
domain of a State's public policy. Because there is lack of agree-
ment as to the relevant factors and divergent interpretations of
their meaning, as well as differences in assessing what is the short
and what is the long view, the clash of fact and opinion should
be resolved by the democratic process and not by the judicial
sword. Invalidation here would mean denial of power to the
Congress as well as to the forty-eight states." '5
This argument, of course, only emphasizes the unwisdom of the
decision in the Hughes case which had equated the judicial and legis-
33. 315 U. S. 769 (1942).
34. 339 U. S. 470 (1950)-Mr. Justice Clark concurred in the result only.
35. Id. at 478. a
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lative aspects of law making. Unfortunately this aspect of the prob-
lem was not stressed by the dissenting judges. Justice Black referred
only to his opinion in the Ritter case. 6 Justice Minton dissented sepa-
rately and was joined by Justice Reed. He concluded that the de-
cision now reached was inconsistent with many earlier cases and said:
"It seems equally clear to me that peaceful picketing which is
used properly as an instrument of publicity has been held by this
Court in Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88; Carlson v. Cali-
fornia, 310 U.S. 106; American Federation of Labor v. Swing,
312 U.S. 321 ; Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers Local v. Wohl,
315 U.S. 769; and Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos, 320
U.S. 293, to be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. I do
not understand that in the last three mentioned cases this Court,
as the majority in its opinion says, 'held only that a State could
not proscribe picketing merely by setting artificial bounds, unreal
in the light of modern circumstances, to what constitutes an in-
dustrial relationship or a labor dispute.' If the states may set
bounds, it is not for this Court to say where they shall be set,
unless the setting violates some provision of the Federal Con-
stitution. I understand the above cases to have found violations
of the federal constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech, and
the picketing could not be restrained because to do so would vio-
late the right of free speech and publicity." "
From these various cases we can perhaps draw the following prin-
ciples:
1. Indiscriminate bans on peaceful picketing whether by statute
or injunction violate the Constitution.
2. Peaceful picketing may be enjoined when it is part of an ac-
tivity which the state, whether by its legislature or its highest court,
has declared contrary to public policy-subject, of course, to the pro-
viso that such a declaration be itself constitutional. It is thus in this
area that the discussion is likely to take place in the future since state
courts will be sufficiently astute to take the hint contained in Mr. Jus-
tice Frankfurter's opinion and hereafter to declare as illegal any ob-
jective toward which the picketing which they seek to enjoin is
directed.
3. Between these extremes lies an area about which no safe pre-
diction can be made-that is, if the state courts, failing to take the
hint, let such an area remain. There the validity of a ban on peace-
ful picketing will depend on whether the majority of the Supreme
36. 315 U. S. 722, 729 (1942).
37. 339 U. S. 470, 482.
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Court considers that the state has confined the picketing to an "un-
realistic" area.
We have traveled a long way. For a time it seemed as though
peaceful picketing were going to receive real constitutional protection.
Now it looks as though state courts, by the simple device of declaring
union objectives contrary to public policy, can ban peaceful picketing
in almost all situations where there is room for difference of opinion
as to these objectives. We seem to be on the road back to govern-
ment by injunction.
